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The only point I want to make is very simple, but its implications are immensely
important.  The writers of a Constitution that carefully separated powers out of fear of
executive authority and who, even then, saw that it could only be ratified after a Bill
of Rights was added, could not have intended that the President be given unilateral
control of an on/off switch for both of these sets of protections against executive power.
I could stop there.
I. ARTICLE II
I am persuaded that a presidential signing statement, an interpretation of a new
law, is just one of a number of forms by which  the President can direct executive
branch activity, with certain advantages and disadvantages to each.  I take seriously
the argument that the President, under an extension of the principles of Marbury v.
Madison,' has a responsibility to direct subordinates not to enforce at least some stat-
utes on the grounds that they are plainly unconstitutional.  I wonder whether this logic
would not take us, as well, to the obligation of executive subordinates not to enforce
any presidential directives or statutes they regard as unconstitutional-a consequence
that nobody recommends.  I am not at all sure that a distinction can be drawn between
his protection of Article II powers, such as the appointment power,2 and his protection
of the Bill of Rights.  I recognize that the precedents have drawn no such distinction,
although the former seems to pose more of a conflict of interest.
Still, no chain of reasoning in terms of premises that start with the normal priority
of the Constitution over statutes3 can convince me that the President was given inde-
pendent control of an on/off switch labeled "war"  or "no war"  against individuals or
groups-a switch that empowers  him to set aside vast portions of the Constitution
and, in particular, those portions that were intended to control his powers.  That simply
cannot be.  If, as history and policy both dictate, the executive enjoys highly excep-
tional powers and independence in times of "war,"  Congress and the courts have to
control that switch.
* James Bar  Ames  Professor of Law, Harvard  Law School;  Co-Author with Juliette
Kayyem, PHILIP B. HEYMANN  & JULIETrE N. KAYYEM, PROTECTING LIBERTY IN AN  AGE OF
TERROR  (2005); Former Deputy U.S. Attorney General, Clinton Administration.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch)  137 (1803).
2  U.S. CONST.  art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
'  See id. art. VI, cl. 2.WILLIAM  &  MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
My argument thus does not require concluding  that, in times of armed conflict
between the United States and another state, the President lacks extraordinary powers.
My argument does not even require me to insist that any such conflict be something
recognizable  as very similar to a past war before Congress can agree, in a way that is
likely to bind the courts, that the President has the extraordinary powers that Lincoln
and Roosevelt exercised.  My argument is simply that, except for a short period of
time after a dangerous emergency arises and before Congress can act, the President
cannot exercise war powers except with the consent of Congress.
The reason is very simple.  In the Constitution, the Framers allocated to Congress
powers which were very carefully withheld from the President4 and the Framers gave
the people liberties which were very carefully protected from the President.'  There
may be rare situations of war or other emergency where some of those fundamental
understandings do not apply, but it would have been absurd for the Framers to allow
a discretionary decision of the President that we were at war with some group of non-
state actors to overturn the most basic framework of the Constitution.
Unlike many other constitutions,  our Constitution does not contain emergency
powers, other than the power of Congress to suspend habeas corpus in times of in-
vasion or rebellion.6  Modem nations that do have emergency powers generally re-
quire legislative authorization of a state of emergency.7  They do not allow the chief
executive to decide for himself when he is to have extraordinary powers.8  Perhaps
very dangerous situations can create something like emergency powers, although the
Framers did not find it necessary to do this explicitly.  But if there are such extraordi-
nary national security powers in the executive, the most rudimentary common sense-
something  the Framers excelled at-would require these powers to be triggered by
another branch.  The Framers  may well have believed they accomplished  this by
vesting in Congress the powers to suspend habeas corpus9 and to declare war.°
II. THE AUTHORIZATION  FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE
Even if the reader agrees with me about the President's claim of Article 1I powers
to set aside normal understandings about the role of Congress and the Bill of Rights,
4  See id. art. I, § 8.
'  See id. amends. I-X.
6  Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
7  See, e.g., La Constitution 1958 CONST. art. 35 (Fr.), translated  in 7 CONSTrrUTIONS OFTE
COUNTRIES OFTHE WORLD (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2005); GRONDWErVOOR HETKONINKR1JKDER
NEDERLANDEN  [GW]  [Constitution] art. 25 (Neth.), translated  in 13  CONsTrrUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OFTHE WORLD (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2007); REGERINGSFORMEN  [RF] [Constitution]
10:9 (Swed.), translated  in 17 CONSTITUTIONS  OFTHE COUNTRIES OFTHE WORLD (Gisbert H.
Flanz ed., 2007).
8  id.
9 U.S. CONST. art. I,  § 9, cl. 2.
10 Id. § 8,  cl.  11.
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the reader may still accept the President's argument that the Authorization for Use
of Military Force,"  passed by Congress soon after September 11,  2001, provides the
President with all the powers that he needs. 2
The major premise of such an argument is that we no longer require a "declaration
of war" to activate highly exceptional powers in the case of armed conflict with another
state. 3  More recently we have relied on congressional resolutions authorizing  the
use of military force.'4  Thus, the argument goes, the fact that the President obtained
such an authorization to use military force to pursue al Qaeda and its supporters and
that the authorization was in the language we had used in the past to authorize armed
conflict with hostile foreign nations, means that the President was granted the powers
to detain indefinitely, to interrogate cruelly, and to kill or punish without a fair trial
those Americans he thinks are supporters of al Qaeda.
But an interpretation  of words of Congress  that are wholly inexplicit as to the
reach and powers they grant the President may mean one thing against the background
of an armed  conflict with another  state and  something less when  the background
against which the words were used is very different.  The same broad words, which
have in the past granted extensive powers in wars against the forces of nation states,
may be intended to have far more limited meanings as broadly applied to American
citizens accused of supporting a very dangerous but relatively small group of terrorists
without the powers of a state.
Lawyers will disagree as to whether Congress meant to grant such extreme powers.
But there is, at a minimum, obvious uncertainty as to congressional intent to authorize
extraordinary forms of detention, interrogation, or killing of U.S. persons. 5  That un-
certainty  is at the heart of my rejection of the argument that the President can rely
on what Congress has done even if he lacks exclusive Article II powers.
Before explaining, let me again begin by making clear  what is not part of my
argument here.  I do not intend to pass judgment now on the legal effect of an  un-
ambiguous authorization by Congress to use particular, but generally forbidden, forms
of military force against citizens of the United States who had no ties to a hostile state
during an armed conflict with that state.  Resolving whether Congress could itself,
"  Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40,  115 Stat. 224 (2001).
12  See, e.g., President George W. Bush, President's Radio Address (Dec. 17,2005), avail-
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051217.html.
"3  See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National
Security Agency Described by the President (2006), available  at http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/
doj011906.pdf.
14  See, e.g., Authorization  for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40,  115 Stat. 224
(2001); Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-243,  116 Stat.  1498 (2002).
"  See Robert Bloom & William J. Dunn, The Constitutional  Infirmity of Warrantless
NSA Surveillance:  The Abuse ofPresidential  Power  and  the Injury to the Fourth  Amendment,
15  WM.  &MARY  Bi.L RTs. J. 147,  168 (2006).
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free of  judicial review, declare a "real" war on, for example, non-state actors who are
purveyors of weapons of mass destruction, or on powerful organized crime groups,
or on dangerous terrorists-thus empowering the President to exercise powers greater
than the wartime powers of a Roosevelt or a Lincoln-is not necessary to my argu-
ment.  I doubt that Congress could but I need not reach that issue.
My argument is simply that to the extent that the President relies on a congres-
sional authorization to claim powers that are highly unusual and a dangerous departure
from the normal constitutional structure, the authorization by Congress must be very
clear and unambiguous.  And, of course, different background conditions-including
whether what is involved is or is not a familiar armed conflict with another nation-
can mean that similar words may well grant different powers or may be more or less
ambiguous as to the scope of  their authorization.  Whether Congress intended to autho-
rize the powers President Bush has claimed  in dealing with Americans and  aliens
within the United States is, at best, a very uncertain matter.
So how should such uncertainty be resolved?  The unilateral power to interpret
such an authorization  without review of the interpretation by either the judiciary or
the legislature is itself a great power.  Has this power to interpret what Congress ap-
proves, unlike the constitutional power to decide unilaterally whether we are at "war"
with substate groups,
16 been left to the President alone?  For the many situations where
there can be no judicial review, isn't it inevitable that we must trust the President's
lawyers to interpret a statute or resolution by Congress?  The answer is "yes,"  but we
can and should demand certain canons of interpretation in this setting.
In particular, there should be a strong presumption that any action that involves
a dramatic departure from provisions of the Constitution, treaties, or statutes that have
long been thought to apply when there is no war against a foreign nation and that have
been considered basic to our freedoms, must at the very least be clearly intended by
the Congress.  If Congress is to be said to have made lawful the discretionary exercise
of powers that our founders  took great pains to generally deny our chief executive,
Congress must be assumed to have wanted clear, broadly agreed upon interpretations
of its intent-not creative or highly disputable interpretative  constructions.  Other-
wise, the President can call upon lawyers he selects to throw the very switch that the
Constitution has denied him, subject only to reversal at the hands of two-thirds of each
house of Congress. 7  If Congress intends to give the extraordinary wartime powers
exercised by Roosevelt and Lincoln in times of dire danger, short of familiar armed
conflicts with another state, it must and will make itself clear.
There  is one  major difference between  the President's  assertion of Article  II
powers and his assertion that his interpretation of a congressional authorization to use
military force gives him the powers he demands.  As to Article II powers,  my argu-
ment is that the Framers  would not have  allowed the President to control  such an
16 U.S. CONST.  art. I,  § 8,  cl.  11.
" Id. art. I, § 7 (requiring  a two-thirds vote to override  a presidential veto).
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on/off switch in radically reducing the rights of citizens and the powers of Congress,
and the Constitution in fact required the President to seek the authorization of Congress
to exercise war powers even against a state.  When the President purports to rely on
an interpretation  of a congressional statute or resolution, he claims that he already has
the needed congressional authorization, making irrelevant both any dispute about who
has the power to declare war and the analogy to emergency  powers in other coun-
tries.  What is more, there is no obvious alternative to the President interpreting his
statutory authority.
These differences are less consequential than the similarities.  If the congressional
authorization  clearly includes the extraordinary  powers  the President claims,  then
the President does not have his hand on the on/off switch.  Congress has thrown the
switch.  If, at the other extreme, the President's interpretation is far-fetched, and if he
is therefore relying on the fact that the courts cannot review his legal claim, then the
only individuals sharing control of the on/off switch are the lawyers he has hired and
put in place-far too unreliable a check on nearly absolute power.
A President's claim of powers based on a plausible but readily contestable interpre-
tation of congressional action should not be adequate. The fact that the President needs
to seek only a simple majority of each House18 to clarify what powers Congress has
given him-while Congress would need two-thirds of each House to make its equally
plausible point since the President can veto any congressional effort at clarification 9-
strongly suggests that any congressional grants of power must be clear.  There should
be a presumption against the President interpreting ambiguity in a way that makes
major structural changes  in our constitutional framework.
Thus, the Founders'  allocation to Congress of the on/off switch for presidential
war powers also means that Congress bears a burden of clear statement and that absent
that clarity, there shall be a presumption of normal constitutional  protections.2 0  It is
not enough that the President's lawyers have embraced an interpretation of the powers
Congress granted, particularly with regard to American citizens, that would authorize
extraordinary  measures.  Those lawyers, at their most independent, understand that
they are obligated to go or stretch as far as they decently can to find support for the
President's  position.  At their least independent, they authorize whatever he wants.
IS Judicial  Nominations, Filibusters,  and the Constitution:  When a Majority is Denied
its Right to Consent: Hearing  Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and
Property  Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,  108th Cong. 269-70 (2003) (statement of
Michael J.  Gerhardt, Professor, William & Mary School of Law) (explaining that, outside of
the seven instances in the Constitution explicitly requiring a two-thirds vote, the Framers may
have intended all other votes to be by a simple majority).
19  U.S. CONST. art. I,  § 7.
20  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,460-61,464 (1991)  (recognizing a "plain statement
rule" requiring the Court to be "absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise"
when interpreting legislation).
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And the President is empowered,  as he has dramatically shown in the case of fired
U.S. attorneys,  to replace the independent with the loyal.2'
LII. AN APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES
Lest my arguments about interpretation of an authorization seem too abstract, let
me close with the example of the President's power to detain a citizen, Jose Padilla, in
a military prison for years without access to a lawyer or court.22  The power to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus is found among those granted to Congress in Article 1.23
Even then, it is limited to "Cases of Rebellion or Invasion. '2 4  The Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution forbids the denial of "liberty" to any person by the federal govern-
ment "without due process of law."'   A federal statute passed in response to the de-
tention  of Japanese-Americans  during World War II forbids the detention  of any
American except pursuant to a congressional  statute.2 6  Even the President's claim of
powers to detain, published soon after September  11,  2001,  was limited to aliens.27
Yet the President ordered the Secretary  of Defense to detain Padilla on unre-
viewed military findings that he was an illegal "enemy combatant" and to deny him
access to judicial process.28 The contention  was simply (1) that we were at war, trig-
gering all historically exercised presidential war powers, and these could not be con-
trolled by Congress; and (2) that in any event the very general wording of Congress's
Authorization  for Use  of Military  Force  would cover  the  secret detention  of an
American citizen, although there was not the remotest suggestion that Congress had
any such thing in mind or would have agreed to any such power.29
I assume that the President's lawyers told him that he could do whatever Lincoln
had done during the Civil War3° and assert whatever powers Roosevelt had claimed
in the Quirin  case3' during the second world war.  But if President Bush were to have
21  See Preserving  Prosecutorial  Independence:  Is the Department  of  Justice Politicizing
the Hiring  and Firing  of U.S. Attorneys? Hearing  Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,  11  Oth
Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of Sen. Charles E. Schumer, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
2  See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430-32 (2004).
23  U.S.  CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
24  Id.
2  Id. amend. V.
26  18 U.S.C. § 4001  (2000).
27  Directive on Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies, 37 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1570 (Oct. 29, 2001).
28  Rumsfeld  v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430-31  (2004).
29  Id. at 431; see Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001).
30  See Proclamation No. 7, 13 Stat. 734 (Sept. 15, 1863) (suspending habeas corpus during
the Civil War).
3' Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S.  1 (1942)  (upholding the jurisdiction of a military tribunal
created by President Roosevelt).
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the power to detain Americans free of judicial review, it would have to be because
Congress had agreed unmistakably that he should have such powers on the ground
that we were in a war like that facing Lincoln and Roosevelt in all relevant respects.
His lawyers cannot, by highly disputable interpretations of an inexplicit authorization,
limit the power of Congress in so many ways or the rights of citizens in such funda-
mental ways.  Whether the President purports to act by a directive, as in this case,
or by a signing statement, our freedoms  cannot depend on the President deciding
that the conditions are right or not right for throwing a self-empowering switch.